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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Artificial Insemination Heterologous and the Matrimonial Offense of
Adultery in the United Kingdom
Professor Hager's analysis' of problems incidental to the practice
of artificial insemination discussed the controversial legal question
whether artificial insemination heterologous2 constitutes the matrimonial offense of adultery. It may be of value to supplement his
reference to American and Canadian authorities by some discussion
of the attitudes adopted on this issue by lawyers and courts in the
United Kingdom.
Justice Vaisey and H. U. Willink, K.C., the legal representatives
of a commission appointed in 1948 by the Archbishop of Canterbury to investigate the theological, ethical, sociological and legal
aspects of artificial human insemination, expressed no doubt that
the perpetration of A.I.D. legally would constitute adultery on the
part of both the married donor and the married recipient.' However, in debate in the House of Lords in March 1949, Lord Merriman, President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of
the English High Court, roundly criticized this opinion as "absolute nonsense." 4 The conclusion of the commissioners was based
5
primarily upon the decision of Justice Orde in Orford v. Orford
and a dictum of Lord Dunedin in Russell v. Russell.' In the latter
case the learned law Lord stated :7 "The appellant conceived and
had a child without penetration having ever been effected by any
man. ...
The jury... came to the conclusion that she had been
'Hager, Artificial Insemination: Some Practical Considerations for
Effective Counseling, 39 N.C.L. REV. 217, 232-35 (1961).
' Artificial insemination heterologous is the technical term applied to instances where the seminal fluid to be used must be taken from a male other
than the husband of the recipient. This technique is more popularly known

as artificial insemination donor, see Hager, supra note 1, at 222-23, and will
be referred to hereinafter as A.I.D.
'ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY'S COMMISSION ON ARTIFICIAL HUMAN
INSEMINATION, REPORT ON ARTIFICIAL HUMAN INSEMINATION 37 (London,

1948).
'161 H.L. DEB. (5th ser.) 410 (1949). Two eminent Lord Chancellors,
Lord Jowitt and Lord Kilmuir, have also regarded A.I.D. as falling outside
of adultery.

161 H.L. DEB. (5th ser.) 511 (1950); 207 H.L. DEB. (5th

ser.) 982, 1008 (1958).
[1921] 49 Ont. L.R. 15, [1921] 58 D.L.R. 251.
[1924] A.C. 687.
7
Id. at 721.
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fecundated ab extra by another man unknown, and fecundation ab
extra is, I doubt not, adultery."
A liberal interpretation of this dictum would suggest that adultery is not confined to a mutual surrender of the sexual organs but
extends to a mutual surrender of the reproductive faculties by means
of artificial insemination. Such an interpretation, however, divorces
the statement from its context for it totally ignores the circumstances in respect of which Lord Dunedin's opinion was expressed.
The fecundation ab extra referred to in Russell resulted not from
artificial insemination but from certain acts of intimacy which fell
short of a penetration of the female sexual organ.
The direct question whether A.I.D. constituted adultery was considered comparatively recently by the Scottish Court of Session in
Maclennan v. Maclennan.' The facts of this case may be briefly
summarized. The husband petitioned for divorce on the ground of
his wife's adultery. The wife alleged that the child to whom she
had given birth had been conceived as a result of her artificial insemination with the seed of a donor. The husband contended that
this defense was irrelevant since A.I.D. was adultery in the eyes
of the law, and further maintained that he did not consent to his
wife's impregnation. After stating that specification of the time
and place of the alleged artificial insemination was necessary to the
admissibility of the wife's defense, the court, in a preliminary judgment by Lord Wheatley, ruled that A.I.D. did not constitute
adultery.9 It was conceded by the court that a married woman
committed a grave and heinous offense against the marriage contract by submitting to artificial insemination without her husbands
consent. Nevertheless, this was considered a matter in respect of
which the legislature should determine an appropriate remedy and
was deemed quite irrelevant to the issue before the court. Following a careful analysis of the authorities, including Doornbos v.
Doornbos,0 Russell v. Russell" and Clark (otherwise Talbot) v.
' [1958] Sess. Cas. 105, [1958] Scots L.T.R. 12.
'An adjournment was granted to allow entry of the necessary amendments to the wife's defense. Counsel subsequently intimated to the court
that the defendant had declined to provide the information needed to cure
the defect in the pleadings; accordingly the court sustained the plaintiff's
plea that the defense was irrelevant and sent the case to the undefended roll.
1023 U.S.L. WEEK 2308 (1954), discussed in Rossman & Allen, What's
New in the Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 263 (1955); Tallin, Artificial Insemination,
34 CAx. B. REv. 1, 14-15 (1956).
"[1924] A.C. 687.
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Clark,2 Lord Wheatley observed :"s
[I] t seems possible to derive [from the cases] the following propositions, according at least to the law of England.
1. For adultery to be committed there must be the two
parties physically present and engaging in the sexual act
at the same time.
2. To constitute the sexual act there must be an act of
union involving some degree of penetration of the female
organ by the male organ.
3. It is not a necessary concomitant of adultery that male
seed should be deposited in the female's ovum.
4. The placing of the male seed in the female ovum need
not necessarily result from the sexual act, and if it does not,
but is placed there by some other means, there is no sexual
intercourse.
I appreciate that the second of these findings does not
square with Lord Dunedin's obiter dictum in Russell, which
seems to conflict with the decision of Pilcher, J., in Clark
, but even on Lord Dunedin's standard, the physical
presence of the male organ and its close proximity and
juxtaposition to the female organ seem to me to be essential
ingredients of the act.
This opinion no doubt represents a rational judgment to the
person who views intent as the essence of adultery.'4 To the matrimonial lawyer, however, it may reflect too rigid acceptance of the
concept of adultery, the foundation of English divorce laws, in that
it denies opportunity for the courts to afford legal recognition to
a socially existing fact, namely, a broken marriage.
The decision of Lord Wheatly was the subject of debate in the
House of Lords in February 1958, and in September of that year
a departmental committee was appointed "to enquire into the exist2 [1943] 2 All E.R. 540 (P.D.A.). In this case Pilcher, J., held that
the marriage in issue had never been consummated despite the wife's fecundation ab extra by her husband.
" Maclennan v. Maclennan, [1958] Sess. Cas. 105, 113, [1958] Scots
L.T.R. 12, 17.

"'See generally Guttmacher, The Legitimacy of Artificial Insemination,

11 HUMAN FERTIL. 16, 17 (1946): "From the physician's point of view
it is the intent which is all important. Adultery and artificial insemination

are actually the absolute antithesis of each other. One is done clandestinely

to deceive and enjoy carnal pleasure; the other decently and frankly to
beget offspring without the emotional and physical enjoyment of coitus."
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ing practice of human artificial insemination and its legal consequences and to consider whether, taking account of the interests
of individuals involved and society as a whole, any change in the
law is necessary or desirable." In its report,"; which was presented
to Parliament at Westminster in July 1960, the committee expressed
the general conclusion that A.I.D. should neither be prohibited nor
even regulated by law. In the context of matrimonial law it accepted the view previously adopted by the Royal Commission on
Marriage and Divorce, 1951-195516 that a clear distinction be
drawn between artificial insemination and adultery. The departmental committee 17 endorsed the recommendation of the Royal
Commission that artificial insemination of the wife without the
consent of her husband be made a new and separate ground of
divorce or judicial separation. It further recommended that such
a course of conduct on the part of a wife should entitle the husband
to take proceedings in the magistrate's courts for a separation order.
It should be observed that the committee made no recommendation providing a matrimonial remedy for the wife whose husband
donated semen for purposes of artificial insemination. This omission is unfortunate insofar as it reintroduces inequality between the
sexes before the law. There are, of course, certain practical difficulties which impede the application of similar recommendations to
the husband donor for, under present conditions, the anonymity
which surrounds the donor's identity will generally preclude discovery of the offense by the wife. Although this particular difficulty might be met by statutory control or regulation of the practice of artificial insemination, other difficult legal problems would
remain. For example, would the husband be penalized where his
donation was made before marriage but utilized subsequent thereto?
The present inaction of Parliament at Westminster indicates a
reluctance to legislate in this controversial province of law. Consequently, the judiciary remains confronted with the unenviable task
of resolving legal issues pertaining to artificial insemination without
any prior legislative determination of general policy considerations.
JULIAN D. PAYNE*
15

Human Artificial Insemination Committee, First Report, CAID. No.

1105, at 263 (1960).

" Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, First Report, CMD. No.
9678, at 90 (1956).
Human Artificial Insemination Committee, supra note 15, at 115-17.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon,
Canada.

